An experimental study of mixed strategy equilibria in simultaneous price-quantity games by Cracau, Daniel & Franz, Benjamin
WORKING PAPER SERIES
An experimental study of mixed strategy equilibria in 
simultaneous price-quantity games
Daniel Cracau/Benjamin Franz
Working Paper No. 17/2012
 Impressum (§ 5 TMG)  
Herausgeber:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg  
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft  
DFS Dekan  
 
Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg 
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
Postfach 4120  
39016 Magdeburg  
Germany  
http://www.Gww.PWHVEF/femm
Bezug über den Herausgeber 
ISSN 1615-4274 
Daniel Cracau
An experimental study of mixed strategy
equilibria in simultaneous price-quantity games
by Daniel Cracau∗ and Benjamin Franz†
Abstract
We study oligopoly games with firms competing in prices and quan-
tities at the same time. We systematically compare our experimental
results to the theoretical predictions using the mixed strategy equi-
libria for linear demand functions. For the duopoly game, we observe
that the mixed strategy equilibrium predicts average outcomes better
than Cournot and Bertrand do. Subjects’ price choices are mainly
between marginal cost and monopoly level but do not follow the equi-
librium distribution. Although average prices and profits are above
theoretical values, we do not observe a high level of collusion as ex-
pected in the literature. By comparing simulations based on the mixed
strategy equilibrium to our experimental outcomes, we conclude that
in this game price setting can be explained by strategic reaction to
preceding round results. In contrast to the equilibrium prediction,
we observe a decrease in prices and negative average profits for the
triopoly game.
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1 Introduction
The first systematic analysis of economic games that include both, prices
and quantities as strategic market interaction variables was conducted by
Shubik (1955). The study of this types of game was the logical enhancement
of the intensive research on pure quantity competition (Cournot, 1838) and
pure price competition (Bertrand, 1883) in the systematic investigation of
oligopolistic competitions.
When considering games that include price and quantity in an oligopolis-
tic setting, one often distinguishes between three groups of games. The first
class includes games that incorporate a price competition under a certain
kind of capacity limitation. In all of these models, the production rate of a
player is directly determined by their price choice, i.e. quantities are not in-
cluded as decision variables. Starting with Edgeworth (1897), several models
were developed to analyse the effect of a capacity binding on the outcome
in markets with pure price competition. Levitan and Shubik (1972) showed
that the characteristic properties of the equilibrium depend on the degree
of capacity limitation. They derive the pure strategy equilibria for highly
limited and excessive capacities. For intermediate capacity constraints, a
mixed strategy equilibrium emerges. These results were generalised for ar-
bitrary demand functions by Osborne and Pitchik (1986) and arbitrary cost
functions by Maskin (1986).
The main characteristic of the second class of games is a sequential choice
of both, prices and quantities by the players. Often, the models include a
simultaneous decision on production capacities before a simultaneous price
competition. In Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) it was proved that (under mild
assumptions about demand) the unique equilibrium outcome in this game is
identical to the Cournot outcome. More generally, Friedman (1988) shows
that each pure strategy equilibrium in this setting is equivalent to the pure
strategy equilibrium in the same game without price setting. Additionally,
he proves that the equilibria in the game with simultaneous price setting
before simultaneous quantity setting and in the pure price competition are
identical.
In the third class — so called price-quantity (PQ) games — firms en-
dogenously have to decide on their prices and their quantities at the same
time. The main difference between the second class and the third class of
games therefore is the sequence of actions. The PQ games are also known as
price competitions with perishable goods and production in advance and are
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characterised by the absence of any pure strategy equilibria.1 The first mixed
strategy equilibrium was presented in Levitan and Shubik (1978), where a
model with linear demand as well as positive inventory carrying cost is anal-
ysed. Moreover, Gertner (1986) establishes the mixed strategy equilibrium
for more general settings and also provides equilibrium properties for increas-
ing production cost. In this article we use an experimental setting to further
investigate the game described in Gertner (1986).
The experimental literature on games of all previously described classes is
continuously growing, see Engel (2007) for a comprehensive overview. Models
with real simultaneous quantity and price choices, however, have scarcely
been analysed in the laboratory. One example of an experimental PQ game is
given in Brandts and Guillen (2007), where collusion in repeated duopoly and
triopoly games with fixed groups is studied. Market demand in their setting is
inelastic and subjects decide on prices and costly production simultaneously.
They observe that markets tend to monopolistic prices as a consequence of
either bankruptcy or collusion.
In this article, we experimentally investigate repeated duopoly and tri-
opoly PQ games with a linear demand and without exogenous capacity con-
straints. In contrast to Brandts and Guillen (2007), we are interested in the
validity of the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games derived in Gertner
(1986), and thereby hope to contribute to the body of literature on clas-
sical oligopolistic competition. We provide the first systematic comparison
between experimental data and the mixed strategy equilibrium of the PQ
game. In Cracau and Franz (2011) we have already shown that an experi-
mental analysis is appropriate for this investigation, as the mixed strategy
equilibrium of the discrete (experimental) game converges towards the equi-
librium of the continuous game, if the discretisation parameter is sufficiently
low. In this pre-study, we focused on the numerical aspects of the discretised
game. A careful analysis of the experimental data, particularly with respect
to the complete equilibrium prediction and previous experimental literature,
is therefore the main goal of this article.
Our experimental results indicate that benchmarks from the Cournot,
the Bertrand and the mixed strategy equilibrium do not predict subjects’
price choices satisfactory. Although subjects chose prices seemingly at ran-
1Games with each firm deciding simultaneously on their price and quantity but in an
exogenous sequence, however, are known to have pure strategy equilibria, e.g. Gelman
and Salop (1983).
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dom from a range between the monopoly price and marginal cost, the price
distribution significantly differs from the mixed strategy equilibrium pre-
dicted in Gertner (1986). We additionally observe a difference between the
price choices of preceding round winners and loser, with the latter tending to
decrease their prices. A similar effect emerges in the mixed strategy equilib-
rium. Using simulations, however, we are able to show that the effect in the
experiment is much more profound than in the mixed strategy equilibrium.
We thus conclude that price setting underlies a strategic behaviour rather
than a focal point or a random distribution.
The article is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model
of the PQ game. The experimental procedure is presented in Section 3 and
the experimental outcome follows in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss these
outcomes in comparison to the related literature and finally Section 6 briefly
concludes and explores ideas for future investigations.
2 The model
In this section we present the general model used for the experiments along
with theoretical results from the literature. We start by explaining the
duopoly game, before stating some results for a general game with n (> 2)
firms. Let us therefore initially consider a game of two firms (i = 1, 2) that
decide simultaneously on their price pi and their production level qi. Products
are assumed to be homogeneous between the firms and the market demand
is a given function D(p). The game follows the winner-takes-all-rule, i.e. the
firm i with the lower price sells its full output qi up to the market demand
D(pi). The firm j (j = i) that decided on the higher price can now satisfy
the residual demand, which is given through the efficient rationing rule
D(pj|pi) = D(pj)− si ,
where si is the amount sold by the lower-price competitor i.
2 For the case
of equal prices (p1 = p2), the market demand is shared equally between the
firms, as far as the production levels qi allow. These rules can be summed
2Davidson and Deneckere (1986) discuss different rationing rules. In general, the choice
of the rationing rule can have a major impact on the equilibrium of an oligopoly game. For
the model presented here, however, Gertner (1986) shows that the results are not affected
by choosing efficient rationing instead of proportional rationing.
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up by the following equation for the sales si of firm i (Gertner, 1986),
si(p1, q1, p2, q2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
min[qi, D(pi)] , if pi < pj ,
min [qi, D(pi)− sj] , if pi > pj ,
min
[
qi, D(pi)−min
{
qj,
D(pj)
2
}]
, if pi = pj .
(1)
To find an expression for the payoff πi of firm i we introduce the production
cost C(q), which is assumed to be equal for both firms. Using si as given in
(1), the payoff πi is given by
πi = pisi − C(qi) .
Gertner (1986) explains that a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist in
this game. Hence, we focus on a mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e. each of the
firms’ strategies can be described by the probability density function fi(pi, qi)
that formally states the probability of firm i to play the strategy (pi, qi).
According to Shubik (1959), the probability density function f1(p1, q1) and
f2(p2, q2) form a mixed strategy equilibrium, if the integrals
V¯i =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
πi(p1, q1, p2, q2)dfj(pj, qj) ,
are constant for all strategies (pi, qi) played with positive probability accord-
ing to fi(pi, qi). Shubik (1959) refers to V¯i as the value of the game for firm
i, i.e. the maximum guaranteed profit it can achieve if the strategy of the
opposition player is known. Note that in the case of the symmetric game con-
sidered here, the mixed strategy equilibrium is also symmetric, which means
f1 ≡ f2. For our experiments we make the following simplifying assumptions
of linear demand and cost curves:
D(pi) = a− bpi , C(qi) = cqi ,
where a, b and c are non-negative constants. We are therefore considering a
game with constant marginal cost, for which Gertner (1986) proved that all
Nash equilibria satisfy V¯i = 0. The mixed strategy equilibrium derived in
Gertner (1986) has the property that all strategies with positive probabilities
are situated on the line p = D(q), i.e. each firm always produces exactly the
5
market demand D(pi) corresponding to the chosen price pi. The probability
distribution for the prices is given through the distribution function
F (p) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 , for p < c ,
1− c/p , for c ≤ p < a ,
1 , for p ≥ a .
(2)
In particular, this implies that each firm has two options: (i) it can leave
the market by choosing pi = a with a (non-zero) probability of c/a or (ii)
it can stay in the market and choose a price from the interval [c, a) using
the distribution function F (p) as given in (2). Looking at the probability
density function corresponding to F (p), we see that firms are more likely to
play lower prices than higher prices. The lower price firm earns a positive
profit, while the other firm faces losses equal to its production costs C(q),
but expected profits are equal to zero.
One can easily generalise the rules of the game for an arbitrary num-
ber (n ≥ 2) of firms. The existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium can be
generalised from the duopoly to the oligopoly game (Gertner, 1986). The dis-
tribution function related to the mixed strategy equilibrium in the oligopoly
settings takes the form
Fn(p) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 , for p < c ,
1− (c/p) 1n−1 , for c ≤ p < a ,
1 , for p ≥ a .
(3)
In particular, this implies that with increasing n the probability of market
entry decreases, but the average price played in case of market entry increases.
Similarly to the duopoly game, the expected profit for each of the firms is
zero.
3 Experimental Procedure
Our experiment was designed to fit the simplest form of a PQ game. We
label our duopoly treatment as PQ2 and our triopoly treatment as PQ3.
Each treatment consists of a two-stage game with fixed groups of randomly
assigned subjects. Each subject in a group controlled one of the symmetric
firms A or B (or C in the PQ3 treatment). In the five rounds of the first
stage, we let each firm act in a monopolistic market to allow the participants
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time to get used to the game. Afterwards, in the 20 rounds of the second
stage, firms competed in a common (duopoly or triopoly) market.
We used the simplified linear demand function D(p) = 100− p (a = 100, b =
1) and let subjects choose prices in the range [0, 100]. Additionally, subjects
had to choose production levels in the range [0, 100].3 For both, price and
quantity choices we allowed for 0.001 increments. This small increment was
chosen, because we have shown that the mixed strategy equilibrium in our
discrete PQ game converges to the one in the continuous game if the incre-
ment is sufficiently small (Cracau and Franz, 2011). We fixed the constant
marginal production cost at c = 10. After the subjects’ simultaneous deci-
sions, profits were calculated as presented in the model in Section 2. Then,
all players were shown a summary with prices, production levels and profits.
At the end of the experiment, subjects’ total payoff consists of the sum of
the payoff of all 25 rounds. Bankruptcy during the course of the game was
not considered.4 In the PQ3 treatment, we added a fixed payment of 3 Euro
at the end of the experiment.
We collected ten independent observations in the PQ2 and nine indepen-
dent observations in the PQ3 treatment during three sessions in June 2011
and July 2012 at the MaXLab experimental laboratory at the University of
Magdeburg. The experimental software was programmed using z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Participants were mainly students from economic fields,
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). On average, the participants in the
PQ2 treatment earned 10.69 Euro and the participants in the PQ3 treatment
earned 9.18 Euro in a 45-minute session.
4 Results
In the first (monopolistic) stage of the game, subjects earned on average 88%
of the possible monopoly profits. As this is in line with the literature (Potters
et al., 2004), we conclude that all participants understood the experimental
procedure and produced reliable observations.
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the experimental results for both treatments.
As firms could sell quantities at different prices subject to the rationing rule,
3For reasons of simplicity, production levels were limited to demand at the chosen price.
Thus, choosing a price equal to 100 automatically corresponds to a market exit.
4For subjects with a negative total balance from the second stage, we set earnings equal
to zero for this stage.
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Table 1: PQ2 — Summary of experimental results for all 20 rounds.
Obs. AWP Production Profits Collusion
1 31.50 106.80 850.95 no
2 17.88 103.20 192.52 no
3 52.51 58.90 1838.92 yes
4 23.44 134.26 309.70 no
5 15.34 153.42 -256.30 no
6 26.17 120.80 573.30 no
7 24.57 105.91 527.25 no
8 23.50 119.20 455.50 no
9 18.95 114.50 107.46 no
10 48.10 66.25 1757.50 yes
Av. 28.20 108.32 635.68 -
we follow Brandts and Guillen (2007) in presenting the average weighted mar-
ket prices (AWP). Thereby, the prices at which units are sold are weighted by
their respective market shares. Moreover, we present total market production
and total profits.
To evaluate these outcomes, we calculate benchmarks corresponding to
the Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium, the mixed strategy equilibrium and
the cooperative solution of the game. The benchmarks are presented in
Table 3.
We see that observation 3 and 10 in the PQ2 treatment have lower pro-
duction levels and higher average profits than the other observations. As
these two observations are close to the cooperation benchmark, we identify
them as collusive. Once both participants have agreed on a price at the
or close to the monopoly level, the demand is shared equally between the
parties. This yields high profits for both players. For the remaining eight
observations, we do not observe cooperation, indicated by the low AWP and
profits. In the PQ3 treatment, we see no cooperation at all.
The average AWP for the competitive pairs in the PQ2 treatment is
22.67 and thus between the Cournot and Bertrand prediction. Moreover,
it seems to be close to the prediction of the mixed strategy equilibrium.
However, Figure 1 illustrates that the distribution of prices differs visibly
from the mixed strategy equilibrium prediction given in (2). We observe a
greater fraction of prices in the range [10, 55] than predicted. In total, we
only observe 18 out of 320 (≈ 5.6%) prices above the monopoly / cartel price
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Table 2: PQ3 — Summary of experimental results for all 20 rounds.
Obs. AWP Production Profits Collusion
1 11.66 200.73 -983.93 no
2 17.15 126.43 -200.94 no
3 17.67 108.95 114.07 no
4 12.53 219.40 -1159.28 no
5 13.31 147.04 -374.99 no
6 19.70 107.50 291.32 no
7 16.87 183.22 -511.58 no
8 12.63 132.58 -480.85 no
9 15.19 129.82 -126.77 no
Av. 15.19 150.63 -381.44 -
Table 3: Theoretical benchmarks.
Prediction AWP Production Profits
Cournot (duopoly) 40 60 1800
Cournot (triopoly) 32.5 67.5 1518.75
Bertrand 10 90 0
mixed strategy (duopoly) 19 134.95 0
mixed strategy (triopoly) 23.68 140.26 0
cooperation 55 45 2025
p = 55, compared to the 18.2% predicted by the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Market exit decisions were not observed frequently, prices equal to 100 were
not observed at all. However, we observe 9 decisions with quantities equal to
zero which we denote as a market exit.5 This is in contrast to the predicted
10% market exits in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Overall, we conclude
that subjects may perceive prices above the monopoly price as implausible
and therefore choose from a modified distribution with prices in the range
[10, 55], i.e. between marginal cost and the monopoly level.
In order to analyse various trends in the behaviour of the participants
in the PQ2 treatment, we now look at the time development of the market
description values presented in Table 1. First, the evolution of the AWP
over time is presented in Figure 2. We see no significant trend, except for a
drop in prices during the first 3 rounds. This initial drop occurs, because the
5To unify the distribution function, we set prices equal to 100 for all market exits.
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Figure 1: PQ2 — Probability distribution function. Observations (solid
line), prediction (dashed line).
players were biased towards the monopoly price p = 55 from the first stage
of the game. This bias, however, disappears quickly as the participants get
used to the new situation and the AWP stays on the lower level.
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Round
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P
Figure 2: PQ2 — Average weighted price. Observations (solid line), predic-
tion (dashed line).
The development of profits over time in the PQ2 treatment can be found
in Figure 3. We, again, see no significant trend. We observe that the total
payoff for participants in the non-collusive pairs is positive in 14 out of 16
cases. We calculate the average profit over all rounds of the competitive
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pairs to be 172.52. This result contrasts the predictions made by the mixed
strategy equilibrium, where the expected profit of both players is 0. Using a
one-sided Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, this difference proves to be significant
(p = 0.0197).
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Figure 3: PQ2 — Average profits. Observations (solid line), prediction
(dashed line).
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Figure 4: PQ2 — Average market production. Observations (solid line),
prediction (dashed line).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the market production in the PQ2 treat-
ment, where we see no trend in time. The average market production for the
competitive pairs is 119.76. This is below the expected value of the mixed
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strategy equilibrium but still above the Cournot and Bertrand predictions
and even above total market size. We observe overproduction because firms
had to decide on their production level before knowing their actual demand.
The mixed strategy equilibrium predicts the production to be equal to the
demand at the price in the same decision (q = D(p)). We find no evidence
for this characteristic in the experimental outcome, as only 56% of the pro-
duction decisions satisfied q = D(p) (see Figure 5). We find no significant
difference in profits between players who chose to produce the full market
demand and players who did not. We therefore conclude that subjects had
no disadvantage from deviating from the equilibrium condition q = D(p).
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Figure 5: PQ2 — PQ pairs. Observations (blue stars), prediction (dashed
line).
Result 1. In the duopoly treatment, the observed behaviour differs markedly
from the equilibrium predictions, as can be seen in the different price dis-
tribution, the lower than expected production levels and the positive average
profits.
For the PQ3 treatment, Figure 6 illustrates that the distribution of prices
does not fit the mixed strategy equilibrium prediction given in (3) (n = 3).
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In contrast to the predicted 31.62% market exits, we only observe market
exit decisions in 13 out of 540 choices in this treatment. As in our duopoly
treatment, we observe the vast majority of prices in the range [10, 55]. In
total, we only observe 35 out of the 580 (≈ 6%) prices above the monopoly
price p = 55.
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p)
Figure 6: PQ3 — Probability distribution function. Observations (solid
line), prediction (dashed line).
The market dynamics in the PQ3 treatment are comparable to those in
the duopoly treatment. Figure 7 illustrates the development of the AWP
over time. Similar to the PQ2 treatment, we see a drop in prices during the
first rounds but no further significant trend. Overall, the AWP stays on a
lower level than in the duopoly treatment.6
Result 2. In contrast to the equilibrium prediction, prices in the triopoly
treatment were lower compared to the duopoly treatment.
Figure 8 shows the profits over the 20 rounds in the PQ3 treatment.
Except for the first round, profits are negative. This difference to the equi-
librium prediction of zero profits is significant (one-sided Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test p = 0.0197). We see a slight positive trend with profits seeming to
converge to zero (rank order correlation r = 0.7206, p = 0.000546). Overall,
we observe that the total payoff is negative for 20 out of 27 participants.
6We observe the same effect for individual price choices, with the average price in the
PQ2 treatment (28.74) being higher than in the PQ3 treatment (22.92).
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Figure 7: PQ3 — Average weighted price. Observations (solid line), predic-
tion (dashed line).
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Figure 8: PQ3 — Average profits. Observations (solid line), prediction
(dashed line).
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the market production in the PQ3 treat-
ment. We see a significant negative trend after the first periods (rank order
correlation r = −0.77786, p = 0.000316). Total production is above market
size but close to the mixed strategy equilibrium prediction. Finally, Fig-
ure 10 illustrates that subjects did not always choose to produce full market
demand (only in 28% of the cases).
Result 3. In the triopoly treatment, the observed behaviour differs markedly
from the equilibrium predictions, as can be seen in the different price distri-
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Figure 9: PQ3 — Average market production. Observations (solid line),
prediction (dashed line).
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Figure 10: PQ3 — PQ pairs. Observations (blue stars), prediction (dashed
line).
bution. Production levels and average profits are close to the predictions.
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5 Discussion with respect to the literature
For the very first time in experimental economics, we conducted an experi-
ment with simultaneous price and quantity choice and linear demand. Similar
studies of the PQ game have so far only involved non-linear demand. Brandts
and Guillen (2007) analyse the PQ game in a dynamic setting with inelastic
demand. Their results of markets with two and three firms show a price
development coming close to the monopoly level. This can be explained by
either collusion or bankruptcies. Davis (2011) conducts an experiment to
evaluate the effect of advance production in Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies.
He concludes that the introduction of advance production reduces profits.
This can be partially explained by the reduction of tacit collusion. Note
that in economic terms, advance production is comparable to the costly pro-
duction in the PQ game. Therefore, this finding relates to our duopoly
treatment yielding lower levels of collusion and lower profits than a standard
Bertrand experiment, see for example Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and
Muren (2000).
We are also the first to consider the exact formulation of the underlying
mixed strategy equilibrium prediction and compare it to the experimental
outcomes. For the PQ2 treatment, we find the mixed strategy equilibrium
predicting average outcomes better than the Cournot or Bertrand solution.
Although we find a dispersion of prices and a mixture of positive and nega-
tive profits, subjects’ price and quantity choices do not match the predicted
distribution of the mixed strategy equilibrium. For our treatment with three
firms, price choices do not correspond to the mixed strategy equilibrium at
all. In contrast to the equilibrium prediction, prices are significantly lower
than in the duopoly treatment. Moreover, the frequency of market exits
should increase with a higher number of firms. We find no evidence for this.
The weak prediction power of the mixed strategy equilibrium in oligopoly
games is also found in Brown-Kruse et al. (1994). They study a capacity
constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth game and analyse the explanatory power
of the mixed strategy equilibrium. Neither the classical theories of pure or
mixed strategy Nash equilibria, nor the Bertrand-Edgeworth cycle or tacit
collusion can explain all of the experimental results. Prices tend to fall in
the first periods and then show a dispersion. This dispersion in prices can
be better explained by the Bertrand-Edgeworth cycle theory than by mixed
strategies. Overall, we argue that the mixed strategy equilibrium does not
adequately describe the price choices made by the players in our experiment.
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On the one hand, this finding fits with Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) who
have shown that subjects inexperienced in real life tasks with mixed strate-
gies fail to play even simple mixed strategies. On the other hand, the mixed
strategy equilibrium incorporates unintuitive (high) price choices. Never-
theless, mixed strategy games may be studied using theory, as for example
Dechenaux and Kovenock (2011) studied the game of Brandts and Guillen
(2007).
Theory predicts that the average price is increasing in the number of
firms (Gertner, 1986). Our results indicate the opposite, i.e. average prices
are lower in the triopoly than in the duopoly setting. The finding that
markets with more firms reveal stronger competition is well aligned with
the experimental literature, see for example Dolbear et al. (1968) and Huck
et al. (2004) for quantity competitions, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and
Abbink and Brandts (2008) for price competitions as well as Brandts and
Guillen (2007) for the PQ competition.
To explain actual price choices, we argue that subjects choose prices on
a strategic basis rather than randomly from the mixed strategy equilibrium,
or indeed another probability distribution. To support this, we differentiate
subjects’ price changes in the PQ2 treatment from one round to the next in
dependence of the outcome of the previous round. Figure 11 contrasts the
price decisions of preceding round’s winners and losers for this treatment.
One can clearly see that preceding round’s winners tend to increase their
prices, whereas the majority of losers decrease prices. On average, winners
increase their prices by 5.14 while losers decrease their prices by 7.22. A χ2
test of independence - based on the absolute frequencies as shown in Table 4
- proves this finding to be highly significant (p < 0.0001). We conclude
that prices are not drawn completely randomly but depend on the preceding
round’s outcome. In Table 5 we study this dependence using regression
analysis. We estimate subjects’ price choices in dependence of the previous
round price choices. Moreover, we added a dummy, LOSS, that is 1 if the
subject lost the previous round and 0 otherwise. We can see in Table 5
that preceding round losers ceteris paribus chose significantly lower prices
than preceding round winners. The same reasoning holds for the triopoly
treatment (see Figure 12 and Tables 6 and 7. From this we conclude that
winning / losing the previous round has a major impact on the price choice
of a participant, which in particular means that prices are not randomly
chosen from a distribution. This result contributes to the learning direction
theory (Selten and Stoecker, 1986 and Selten and Buchta, 1999). Subjects use
17
Table 4: PQ2 — Price reactions (absolute frequencies).
price increase price decrease no price change
∑
preceding winner 76 53 20 149
preceding loser 13 111 25 149
preceding ties 6 10 66 82∑
95 174 111 380
Table 5: PQ2 — Regression results
Random-effects regression with price as dependent variable.
(Wald χ2 = 84.52, p = 0.00)
independent variable coefficient standard error Z P > |Z|
Constant 11.37124 2.33827 4.86 0.000
Preceding price 0.51121 0.05739 8.91 0.000
LOSS −4.03411 1.83724 −2.20 0.028
the preceding round’s outcome for their price choice. On average, winner’s
increase prices while losers decrease prices. The effect is stronger for losers.
This result is in line with previous findings, see for example Neugebauer and
Selten (2006) or Ockenfels and Selten (2005) for posted-offer markets and
Bruttel (2009) for a Bertrand duopoly.
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(b) Preceding round’s loser
Figure 11: PQ2 — Price reactions depending on the preceding round’s out-
come.
Result 4. In both treatments, subjects respond to preceding round outcomes.
On average, winners increase prices while losers decrease prices, with the
absolute price by losers being stronger.
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Figure 12: PQ3 — Price reactions depending on the preceding round’s out-
come.
Table 6: PQ3 — Price reactions (absolute frequencies).
price increase price decrease no price change
∑
preceding winner 91 63 27 181
preceding loser 58 220 51 329
preceding ties 1 0 2 3∑
150 283 80 513
To further support the idea of the learning direction theory, we simu-
late eight pairs of agents playing the mixed strategy equilibrium for the PQ
duopoly game with our game parameters from the experiment. Using this
data, we can precisely identify to what extent the pricing pattern we ob-
serve is a behavioural effect. A contrary explanation would be that winner’s
chose to increase prices more often than losers also in the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In the mixed strategy equilibrium of the simple PQ game,
Table 7: PQ3 — Regression results.
Random-effects regression with price as dependent variable.
(Wald χ2 = 140.71, p = 0.00)
independent variable coefficient standard error Z P > |Z|
Constant 9.46346 1.14917 6.34 0.000
Preceding price 0.50441 0.04331 11.62 0.000
LOSS −3.61119 1.59814 −2.26 0.024
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Table 8: Price reactions (absolute frequencies for simulated agents).
price increase price decrease no price change
∑
preceding winner 97 55 0 152
preceding loser 50 102 0 152
preceding ties 0 0 0 0∑
147 157 0 304
preceding round winners will relatively more often increase their prices com-
pared to preceding round losers. Preceding round losers will relatively more
often decrease their prices compared to preceding round winners.
Proof. See A.
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Figure 13: Price reactions depending on the preceding round’s outcome (sim-
ulated agents).
Figure 13 and Table 8 summarise the price changes in the simulation. We
find a great dispersion of prices. Following Proposition 1, we also find pre-
ceding round winner to increase prices relatively more often than preceding
round loser and vice versa. We calculate that in this simulation, preceding
round winners increase prices on average by 8.60 while preceding round losers
decrease their prices on average by 8.60. We thus see that the effect of win-
ning or losing on price changes is stronger than in our experiment. However,
our regression results in Table 9 show that this effect is due to the random
choice from the probability distribution rather than due to behavioural ef-
fects.7
7Note that we used the regression model for reasons of comparability only. For other
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Table 9: Regression results (simulated agents).
Random-effects regression with price as dependent variable.
(Wald χ2 = 1.23, p = 0.5416)
independent variable coefficient standard error Z P > |Z|
Constant 32.13823 4.16788 7.71 0.000
Preceding price 0.07229 0.06910 1.05 0.296
LOSS −0.99094 4.00447 −0.25 0.805
Comparing experimental results and simulation, we conclude that the dif-
ference between preceding round winners and losers seen in the experimental
data is indeed caused by behavioural effects rather than by random strategy
choices.
Result 5. In the experimental data, players react directly to the outcome of
a previous round, rather than drawing prices from a random distribution.
In the duopoly treatment, our game yielded positive average profits in
contrast to the equilibrium prediction of zero profit. On the one hand, we
observe average prices exceeding the predicted expected price. On the other
hand, we find production levels below the level of possible demand in both
treatments. This resulted in a positive residual demand for the higher price
firm in 27% of all rounds.8 Both facts taken together may explain the occur-
rence of positive average profits. However, we are aware of the fact that in
general, competition tends to be lower in economic experiments with fixed
pairs of two than the theory predicts, see for example Muren (2000) for a
Bertrand setting with quantity precommitment and Huck et al. (2004) for a
Cournot setting.
Considering market production, we found that firms do not follow the
equilibrium prediction of full production. In Zhang and Brorsen (2011), the
PQ game is analysed with an agent-based model. Their game fits the rules
of Brandts and Guillen (2007). The results of their simulation match the
experimental results of Brandts and Guillen (2007), at least for the duopoly
markets. For markets with more than two firms the agents fail to reach the ef-
ficiency of the human subjects. The inefficiency is caused by overproduction.
purposes, the regression model is not appropriate.
8In the rest of the rounds, the price of the high price firm was too high to guarantee
any residual demand.
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This relates to the fact that subjects do not always follow the equilibrium
prediction of full production as was also observed in our experiment.
Finally, only two of our ten pairs in the duopoly treatment revealed col-
lusion. For the remaining eight pairs we observe competitive behaviour with
no tendency to cooperation or tacit collusion. This finding fits with Fonseca
and Normann (2008) who study a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth
game. As in our experiment, subjects neither follow the mixed strategy equi-
librium in their game nor agree on a certain price level. For our data, we
have seen that the development of the AWP does not follow any trend. This
result is, however, in contrast to Brandts and Guillen (2007) who expect a
high level of collusion in our framework that should drive prices closer to
the monopoly level. Their experimental design is similar to our setting ex-
cept for four parameters: (i) the number of rounds was 50, (ii) they allowed
for bankruptcies, (iii) marginal cost was c = 50 and (iv) they used an in-
elastic demand function (D = 100). They argue that subjects might take
some time to collude, which is why they chose to analyse a repetition of 50
rounds. However, even in the first 20 rounds of their experiment, prices in-
creased dramatically. We therefore would not expect our results to change,
if we considered a higher number of rounds. Since we excluded bankruptcies,
subjects could act more competitive in the first rounds. If we considered
bankruptcies as a consequence for losses in the first rounds, subjects might
refrain from competition ending up cooperating. Considering their marginal
cost, we suggest that an increase in marginal cost reduces the bandwidth
of possible (competitive) prices. This might make it easier for subjects to
tacitly collude since the variety of competitive strategies was reduced as well.
Studying the effect of marginal cost on willingness to cooperate in a further
work therefore seems promising. Finally, for the difference in demand specifi-
cation, we relate the high competition and the lower prices in our experiment
to the fact that price undercutting is more attractive in this setting as it is
aligned with a quantity expansion. However, note that the mixed strategy
equilibrium is the same for both games.
6 Concluding remarks
We have introduced a precise formulation of the mixed strategy equilibrium
for the simple price-quantity game with linear demand and constant marginal
cost. Using these insights, we are the first to present a systematic compar-
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ison of experimental outcomes with the underlying equilibrium prediction.
Although some of our results are well-known characteristics of market exper-
iments, our duopoly study incorporates three main contributions that had
been not addressed by the existing literature. First, we proved that firms’
pricing behaviour does not follow the mixed strategy equilibrium. Second,
we calculated that average prices differ much more from the Cournot and
Bertrand prediction than from the expected equilibrium prices in the PQ2
treatment. Thus, the mixed strategy equilibrium provides a relatively good
prediction for average prices in this treatment, but it fails to predict sub-
jects actual distribution of price choices. Third, we could show that firms’
responses to preceding round results differ from those that would be also
observed in the mixed strategy equilibrium. By introducing a third firm,
we found similar results. However, the observed behaviour contradicted the
prediction of Gertner (1986) that the average price in the PQ game increases
with an increased number of firms.
A typical caveat of oligopoly experiments with fixed pairs may be the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria. In repeated interactions, reputation effects may
play a role and thus applying a random matching procedure would be a nat-
ural variation of our experiment. However, we find no indication for tacit
collusion (revealed by increasing AWPs or firms taking turns) in our results
with fixed pairs and thus do not expect our results to be dependent on the
matching pattern.
Overall, our results provide a good basis for further analysis of experimen-
tal oligopolies with price-quantity competition. Experimental designs are no
longer limited to deciding between using price or quantity competition in
classic oligopoly markets but may include more realistic bivariate decisions
on prices and quantities. In particular, games with endogenous timing as in
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) or endogenous choice of the decision variable
as suggested by Tasna´di (2006) can be studied experimentally allowing for
simultaneous price-quantity choices.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Let us denote the price chosen by firm i ∈ {1, 2} in round t ∈ N by pti. Let
us further denote the probability of an event X by P (X) and the probability
of an event X given that event Y occurred by P (X|Y ) = P (X ∪ Y )/P (Y ).
Then Proposition 1 can be written in the form
P
(
pti > p
t−1
i |pt−1i < pt−1j
)
> P
(
pti > p
t−1
i |pt−1i > pt−1j
)
,
P
(
pti < p
t−1
i |pt−1i > pt−1j
)
> P
(
pti < p
t−1
i |pt−1i < pt−1j
)
.
In order to simplify the calculation, we introduce the probability density
function of prices in [c, a) as the derivative of the distribution function given
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in (2):
f(p) =
c
p2
, p ∈ [c, a) .
We start by calculating the probability of winning a round P (pti < p
t
j) =
P (pt−1i < P
t−1
j ):
P (pti < p
t
j) =
∫ a
c
f(pti)(1− F (pti))dptj =
1
2
(
1− c
2
a2
)
.
Obviously, the probability of losing a round is identical to this probability
and a tie only occurs if both players choose to exit the market and hence
has a probability of c2/a2. Let us now calculate the probability of a winner
decreasing their price:
P
(
pti < p
t−1
i |pt−1i < pt−1j
)
=
P
(
pti < p
t−1
i < p
t−1
j
)
P
(
pt−1i < p
t−1
j
)
=
∫ a
c
f(pti)
∫ a
pti
f(pt−1i )(1− F (pt−1i ))dpt−1i dpti
1
2
(
1− c2
a2
)
=
1
3
(
1− 2c
2
a(a+ c)
)
.
Due to symmetry, this probability is equal to the probability of a loser in-
creasing their price P
(
pti > p
t−1
i |pt−1i > pt−1j
)
.
The probability of a price increase by a winner can be calculated as one
minus the probability of a price decrease by a winner, because the winning
price must be smaller than a and maintaining the exact same price level
therefore has a probability of zero. Hence:
P
(
pti > p
t−1
i |pt−1i < pt−1j
)
=
2
3
(
1 +
c2
a(a+ c)
)
.
The missing probability we need to calculate is the probability of a price
decrease by a loser. This is not equal to one minus the probability of the
price decrease by a loser, because a loser could have chosen a price equal
to a and can therefore maintain their current price level. We calculate the
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probability through:
P
(
pti < p
t−1
i |pt−1i > pt−1j
)
=
P
(
pti < p
t−1
i , p− it−1 > pt−1j
)
P
(
pt−1i < p
t−1
j
)
=
∫ a
c
f(pt−1i )F (p
t−1
i )
2dpt−1i + (1− F (a))F (a)2
1
2
(
1− c2
a2
)
=
2
3
(
1− 2c
2
a(a+ c)
)
.
All that’s left to do is to verify the inequalities:
P
(
pti < p
t−1
i |pt−1i > pt−1j
)
=
2
3
(
1− 2c
2
a(a+ c)
)
>
1
3
(
1− 2c
2
a(a+ c)
)
= P
(
pti < p
t−1
i |pt−1i < pt−1j
)
,
where the inequality holds because 1 − 2c2
a(a+c)
is always positive for a > c.
The second inequality can be shown straightforwardly as follows:
P
(
pti > p
t−1
i |pt−1i < pt−1j
)
=
2
3
(
1 +
c2
a(a+ c)
)
>
2
3
>
1
3
>
1
3
(
1− 2c
2
a(a+ c)
)
= P
(
pti > p
t−1
i |pt−1i > pt−1j
)
.
29
Experiment 1: Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment! 
From now on, please stop any communication and read the following information with great care. Questions will be 
answered after reading the instructions individually at your place. 
The following experiment deals with the sale of goods. During the experiment, you take over the role of a firm which 
decides on a sales price and a production quantity in a market.  
 The experiment consists of 2 stages, which are played consecutively.   
 At the beginning of the experiment, pairs of two firms are each randomly assigned to one of two markets. 
 During the whole experiment, the assignment of the pairs is fixed. 
Stage 1 
In the 5 rounds of the first stage, each of the two firms is situated as the only firm in one of the two markets. 
 The consumer demand in each of the two markets is determined by: 
o  demand = 100 – sales price 
 You decide on your sales price and on your production quantity. 
o Your sales price has to be chosen in 0.001 increments from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
o Your production quantity has to be chosen in 0.001 increments from the interval [0; 100]. 
  Production results in production costs equal to 10 Taler per unit produced. 
o  Your total production cost are therefore: your production quantity x 10 
 Your maximum production quantity depends on the sales price you have chosen: 
o Maximum production quantity = 100 – your sales price 
 The payoff for each round is calculated by: (sales price – 10) x production quantity 
Before your decision in each round of the first stage, you will find a what-if-calculator. You may insert various 
combinations of your sales price and your production quantity and calculate the corresponding payoff! 
Stage 2 
In the 20 rounds of the second stage, you make the same decisions as in stage 1. As a difference, both firms are now 
situated in the same market. 
 You decide on your sales price in Taler and on your production quantity as in stage 1. 
 If both firms decide on the same sales price, the demand is split equally. 
o Each obtains: demand = (100 – sales price) / 2 
o If one of the two firms has a production quantity which is too low to completely serve its proportion of the 
demand, a residual demand emerges which can be additionally served by the other firm. 
 If the firms decide on different sales prices, the consumer buy first from the firm with the lower price: 
o  demand = 100 – low sales price 
o If the firm with the lower sales price has a production quantity which is too low to completely serve the 
demand, a residual demand for the other firm can emerge. 
o residual demand = (100 – sold quantity) – high sales price 
 the payoff for each round is calculated by: sales price  x sold quantity – 10 x production quantity 
 
At the beginning of the second stage, you will find a what-if-calculator. You may insert various combinations of sales 
prices and production quantities of both firms and calculate the corresponding payoffs! 
 
At the end of the experiment, the sum of all round payoffs determines the total payoff for both firms. 
(The exchange rate is: 1500 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
Experiment 2: Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment! 
From now on, please stop any communication and read the following information with great care. Questions will be 
answered after reading the instructions individually at your place. 
The following experiment deals with the sale of goods. During the experiment, you take over the role of a firm which 
decides on a sales price and a production quantity in a market.  
 The experiment consists of 2 stages, which are played consecutively.   
 At the beginning of the experiment, pairs of three firms are each randomly assigned to one of three markets. 
 During the whole experiment, the assignment of the groups is fixed. 
Stage 1 
In the 5 rounds of the first stage, each of the three firms is situated as the only firm in one of the three markets. 
 The consumer demand in each of the three markets is determined by: 
o  demand = 100 – sales price 
 You decide on your sales price and on your production quantity. 
o Your sales price has to be chosen in 0.001 increments from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
o Your production quantity has to be chosen in 0.001 increments from the interval [0; 100]. 
  Production results in production costs equal to 10 Taler per unit produced. 
o  Your total production cost are therefore: your production quantity x 10 
 Your maximum production quantity depends on the sales price you have chosen: 
o Maximum production quantity = 100 – your sales price 
 The payoff for each round is calculated by: (sales price – 10) x production quantity 
Before your decision in each round of the first stage, you will find a what-if-calculator. You may insert various 
combinations of your sales price and your production quantity and calculate the corresponding payoff! 
Stage 2 
In the 20 rounds of the second stage, you make the same decisions as in stage 1. As a difference, all three firms are now 
situated in the same market. 
 You decide on your sales price in Taler and on your production quantity as in stage 1. 
 If all three firms decide on the same sales price, the demand is split equally. 
o Each obtains: demand = (100 – sales price) / 3 
o If one or more of the three firms has a production quantity which is too low to completely serve its 
proportion of the demand, a residual demand emerges which can be additionally served by the other firms. 
 If the firms decide on different sales prices, the consumer buy first from the firm with the lowes price: 
o  demand = 100 – lowest sales price 
o If the firm with the lowest sales price has a production quantity which is too low to completely serve the 
demand, a residual demand for the firm with the second lowest sales price can emerge. Finally, a residual 
demand can emerge for the firm with the highest sales price. 
o residual demand = (100 – sold quantity) – second lowest sales price 
o If two firms charge the second lowest price, demand is split equally (as described above). 
 The payoff for each round is calculated by: sales price  x sold quantity – 10 x production quantity 
 
At the beginning of the second stage, you will find a what-if-calculator. You may insert various combinations of sales 
prices and production quantities of all three firms and calculate the corresponding payoffs! 
 
At the end of the experiment, the sum of all round payoffs determines the total payoff for both firms. 
(The exchange rate is: 1500 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
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